Privacy functions of the protection of the private sphere or other mobile terminal user by checking functions relating to the forwarding of the position of the mobile radio terminal
The use of position data of aim a bale at Terminal user of a cellular mobile radio network for location dependants services such as for example information about the nearest gas station etc. (Location Services=LCS) is known from 3GPP-TS 23.271. However under some circumstances the user would like avoid any third party being able to interrogate their current position from the mobile radio network. Therefore the mobile terminal user needs a function which defines for any potential party requesting their position from the mobile radio network, whether the notification of this position data of the mobile terminal user to this interrogating party is generally allowed, is basically forbidden or can be allowed after verification with the mobile terminal user. This function is referred to as LCS User Privacy (also LCS user private sphere function).
In accordance with 3GPP Release 4 Standards TS 23.271 and TS 29.002 the LCS-User Privacy is stored for each subscriber in a Home Location Register (HLR) in a number of privacy classes and is downloaded by the HLR to the MSC or SGSN visited by the user, in which case an LCS user privacy function checks whether in the case of an interrogation about the position of the mobile radio terminal (Mobile Terminating Location Request MTLR) position data is to be transferred to the interrogating party from a GMLC. LCS privacy classes are provided for value added services, these being the call session-related class and the call session-unrelated class. In accordance with 3GPP Release 4 the user can specify for each of these two classes up to 240 LCS client IDs and for each client ID (identities potential parties requesting the position of the user) can define comprehensive specifications as to how the MSC/SGSN visited by the user is to perform the LCS user privacy check. For example it is possible to define that the user receives only one LCS notification (that is a notification that someone is requesting their position) or that the user receives an LCS verification (that is a verification to him before transfer of his position to the requesting party) and other options. If the LCS client ID is not stored in a list specified by the user, default behavior is executed in accordance with the user's specifications.
The LCS user privacy defined by 3GPP (3GPP Standard TS 23.271 and TS 29.002) needs relatively large amounts of memory space in the Home Location Register (HLR) of the mobile radio network and in the mobile switching center (MSC-SGSN) and generates a high load during copying of conditions relating to the transfer of position data of the user to a requester from the HLR to the switching center currently being visited by the user (visited MSC/SGSN). One of the reasons why the copying of the conditions is required is because checking of the conditions is undertaken in the switching center during a request for the position of a mobile radio terminal.
The entire checking of the LCS user privacy settings relates here only to the LCS client ID of the requesting LCS client from whom the position request is sent via the GMLC to the switching center.
Further information about the type of the requesting service is not taken into consideration in 3GPP Release 4, and just as little attention is given to the identity of the requester (Requester ID) and conditions associated with it as well as further test conditions such as keywords etc.
These additional conditions (additional attributes) relating to the transfer of position data of a user to a requester and the conditions in accordance with 3GPP Release 4, such as Client ID (LCS privacy data) are to be stored so that any number of additional attributes are possible without the memory space requirement in the HLR being further increased.
A further restriction on the LCS privacy specified in accordance with 3GPP Release 4 is that in the case of national or international roaming (the mobile radio subscriber is not in his home network and is using a location dependent service in the visited a mobile radio network) the use of the LCS privacy function in the visited switching center MSC/SGSN in which the mobile radio subscriber is currently registered is only possible to a restricted extent because the local LCS Client IDs are possibly not known in the HLR and are not correspondingly entered by the mobile radio subscriber in his LCS privacy data.
The approach currently evaluated, in accordance with FIG. 2 (Configuration 1) of storing the additional attributes in a separate LCS central privacy location, accessing this data of the LCS central privacy location from a GMLC and checking the LCS privacy data in the GMLC resolves the problem of restricted memory space in the HLR but presents the following problems to be resolved:
The start or the execution of the Location Subscriber Privacy function (LSPF) is required by 3GPP to be at the switching center MSC/SGSN but is shifted by configuration 1 to the GMLC or into the LCS central privacy location.
The incorporation of the classification of the LCS position request or the separation of the LCS privacy into call/session-related and call/session-unrelated classes in the test process required in accordance with 3GPP is not possible or only possible with considerable effort with Configuration 1 in accordance with FIG. 2. The notification of the current position determination or the demand for the permissibility of a position determination for the mobile subscriber involved, as required in 3GPP Release 4, is not possible with the configuration in accordance with FIG. 2 or is only possible with increased effort.
Each GMLC of any mobile radio network which is connected directly or indirectly to the mobile radio network in which the mobile switching center currently visited by the mobile subscriber is located, can initiate a position request for this mobile subscriber. If the test condition is applied and the result is evaluated in the GMLC, this requires a high level of trustworthiness of this GMLC.
A further use of the user interface of the mobile and terminal user based on Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI) to change his settings of the LCS privacy data in the HLR is not possible for changing his settings of the LCS privacy data in the LCS central privacy location or is only possible with increased effort.
In the case of national or international roaming (the Mobile subscriber is not in his home network and is using a location based service in the visited mobile radio network) it is only possible to use the test condition and to evaluate the result in the GMLC or in the LCS central privacy location by using the data which is stored in the LCS central privacy location in his home mobile radio network with increased effort.
If a number of GMLC and/or a number of LCS central privacy locations are used the assignment is unclear as to which GMLC is to access which LCS central privacy location.
There are the following problems which already exist but are not resolved by a configuration in accordance with FIG. 2:
Changes to the test conditions and the function for using the test conditions are associated with very high administrative effort for the network operator or are impossible if the LCS central privacy location and the network element in which the function for using the test conditions is executed are not collocated and/or cannot be synchronously administered.
3GPP Release 4 only specifies a LCS privacy on the basis of the LCS Client IDs. In the case of national or international roaming—the mobile subscriber is not in his home network and is using a location-based service in the visited mobile radio network) it is only possible to use the test condition and to evaluate the result in the MSC/SGSN in which the mobile subscriber is currently registered to a restricted extent, because the local LCS client IDs must have been known in the LCS central privacy location of the mobile subscriber or must have been correspondingly entered by the mobile subscriber in his LCS privacy data.